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Abstract—Research in combating misinformation reports
many negative results: facts may not change minds, especially
if they come from sources that are not trusted. Individuals can
disregard and justify lies told by trusted sources. This problem
is made even worse by social recommendation algorithms which
help amplify conspiracy theories and information confirming
one’s own biases due to companies’ efforts to optimize for clicks
and watch time over individuals’ own values and public good.
As a result, more nuanced voices and facts are drowned out by
a continuous erosion of trust in better information sources. Most
misinformation mitigation techniques assume that discrediting,
filtering, or demoting low veracity information will help news
consumers make better information decisions. However, these
negative results indicate that some news consumers, particularly
extreme or conspiracy news consumers will not be helped.
We argue that, given this background, technology solutions
to combating misinformation should not simply seek facts or
discredit bad news sources, but instead use more subtle nudges
towards better information consumption. Repeated exposure to
such nudges can help promote trust in better information sources
and also improve societal outcomes in the long run. In this article,
we will talk about technological solutions that can help us in
developing such an approach, and introduce one such model
called Trust Nudging.
Index Terms—misinformation, disinformation, decision sup-
port systems, information trust, nudge theory, recommendation
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many useful and necessary paths to combat-
ing misinformation. These paths include technical methods
to identify incorrect or misleading claims [1], [2], methods
to make correct information more easily available [3], and
methods to identify sources that disseminate incorrect infor-
mation [4], [5]. Some research pathways are non-technical, but
equally if not more important, as they address the underlying
issues and institutions that lead to the creation, dissemination,
and consumption of misinformation [6], [7]. There has also
been significant growth in political fact-checking organiza-
tions, including the fact-checking of news articles, social
media posts, and claims made by politicians [8].
In all these paths, there are various underlying challenges.
Overall, the misinformation problem is deeper than identifying
what is “fake news.” While the dissemination of proven incor-
rect information is a real problem, confirming that specific
information is incorrect can be deeply contextual. This opens
up the information’s correctness to debate which can lead
to suppression of minority voices and opinions. Furthermore,
sophisticated misinformation campaigns mix correct and incor-
rect information, which can cause uncertainty and make dis-
crediting information more difficult. The majority of technical
solutions have focused on classifying these extremes (fake and
real), which leaves automatic assessment of uncertain, mixed
veracity, and deeply contextual information difficult to assess.
A deeper problem that is left unaddressed in the technical
research threads is what to do when information corrections,
whether done by an algorithm or journalist, do not work.
Even if information is correctly discredited, consumers may
choose to ignore the correct information, due to distrust in the
platform, algorithm, or organization providing the corrected
information. This behavior is particularly prevalent among
consumers with extreme or conspiratorial views [9]. If low
veracity information is filtered out or demoted, consumers may
become more extreme and distrust the contemporary media
platforms. The rise of alternative “free speech” platforms such
as Gab and Bitchute are examples of this [10]. Similarly, if
consumers perceive this filtering, demoting, or discrediting as
partisan, distrust in information corrections can persist [11],
[12], resulting in reduced trust for the news source, the
platform/algorithm curating information and the fact-checking
organization. Due to this distrust, solutions to correcting
misinformation can be ineffective for some consumers [9].
In this paper, we begin to address this problem: How can
online media systems, if they are willing to, support trust
in higher quality sources? Specifically, we propose Trust
Nudging, a generic, trust-based recommendation model for
improving the quality of news consumed. This proposed
method is built on the concept of nudging, which provides
alternatives without forbidding any options or significantly
changing the economic incentives [13]. In essence, we would
like to provide alternative sources of information to users at
decision points without taking away any agency from them and
without suppressing information. To do this, we provide subtle
recommendations to readers in order to nudge them towards
news producers of objectively higher quality, but also have a
chance of being trusted; thereby avoiding recommendations
that may not work or may break trust. We leverage news
relationship graphs and the news already read by the consumer
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to approximate the trust of recommended news sources. Using
a simulation, we show that this model can slowly increase the
quality of news a consumer is reading, while not demanding
a substantial shift in trust or ideological beliefs. Furthermore,
we show that, as a side effect, this model lessens the partisan
extremity of the news being read. In addition to simulating
this generic model, we outline different research threads that
can help support this approach, as well as, different choice
architectures that can support better information consumption.
Lastly, we discuss the benefits and potential drawbacks of this
type of recommendation method.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Current Approaches to Misinformation Mitigation
There have been many proposed technical solutions to
combating online misinformation. The vast majority of the
technical solutions have been developed as detection systems,
which can filter out or discredit news that is of low veracity or
provide fact-checking on the claims within the media. These
solutions range widely in terms of technical methods used,
including various types of machine learning models using the
content in news articles and claims [1], [4], [14], deep neural
network models utilizing social features of shared news [15],
source-level ranking models [3], and knowledge-graph models
for fact-checking [2]. Many of these approaches have shown
high accuracy in lab settings. Some approaches have also
shown robustness to concept drift and some adversarial at-
tacks [16].
The assumption of detection-based misinformation solutions
is that discrediting false or misleading information will help
consumers make fully informed decisions. However, there is
reason to believe that discrediting or filtering out bad infor-
mation will not help some news consumers. First, discrediting
information may be ignored by consumers with extreme or
conspiratorial views. As described in [9]: “A distinctive feature
of conspiracy theories is their self-sealing quality. Conspiracy
theorists are not likely to be persuaded by an attempt to
dispel their theories; they may even characterize that very
attempt as further proof of the conspiracy.” This negative
reaction is related to the “back-fire effect,” where the con-
sumer’s beliefs become even stronger when information about
strongly-held beliefs is discredited [17], although this effect
does not consistently occur [18]. Additionally, it has been
shown that discrediting misinformation does not always help
reasoning, making the usefulness of discrediting information
even more nuanced. Specifically, future reasoning can be
influenced by misinformation even if that information has been
corrected or debunked (often called the continued-influence
effect) [19]. This lingering effect can appear as recalling the
incorrect information from memory, even if it was corrected
immediately [20], or maintaining strongly-held attitudes about
the topic, even if beliefs are correctly updated [21], [22]. These
effects not only exist for explicit misinformation, but also
more subtle, implied misinformation in news articles [23]. The
corrective effects of fact-checking can also be limited if they
are given with unrelated contextual information [24].
Second, information trust plays a role in belief updating.
Information trust is a mix of an individual’s own judgment
of information and the trust in the source [25], [26]. When
assessing trust, an individual may rely solely on their own
evaluation of the information, especially if the source is not
trusted, in which case confirmation of the reader’s own beliefs
as well as other heuristics may play a large role [27]. For
example, information that is compatible with a person’s current
beliefs can be seen as more credible and stories that are
coherent may be easier to trust [27]. Many sources disseminat-
ing misinformation have become quite good at targeting such
heuristics [28]. Similarly, for trusted sources, the information
can be accepted as true without much critical evaluation. Trust
for sources is a complex concept as well, evaluated on multiple
axes, such as the alignment of the source’s values with the
reader or their perceived competence.
Over the past decade there has been an erosion of trust in
media and political institutions [11], [12], which can material-
ize as the polarization of trust in news outlets. If an algorithm
recommends news from a high quality source that is initially
distrusted by the consumer, it is unlikely the consumer makes
a change. In the context of politics, a strongly partisan reader
may only trust sources closely aligned with their political
view. In this case, recommending an article from the opposite
political camp is highly unlikely to work. Similarly, telling
the reader of a conspiratorial news source to read an article
from a neutral source is unlikely to yield any impact. As
both disinformation production and information trust become
more politically polarized, methods that filter, block, demote,
or discredit may be less effective, as they may be perceived
as partisan paternalism.
The decline of trust in long-standing news outlets is matched
with an increase in trust of information recommended on social
media [11], although as social media platforms become more
contemporary, this trust has also wavered. Partisan-based trust
in information from social media is concerning as disinforma-
tion is often partisan and more prevalent on social media [29].
Furthermore, a great deal of research and discussion shows that
social media recommendation systems further complicate this
problem [30]. For example, Facebook’s news feed algorithm
has been said to “rewarded publishers for sensationalism,
not accuracy or depth1.” As a result, news sources focused
on providing complete, neutral, and nuanced commentary on
factual events may end up being demoted in news feeds,
providing passive consumers with little opportunity to develop
trust for these high quality sources.
Third, filtering out, blocking, or demoting bad information
can be perceived as loss of agency or suppression of free
speech, which may increase polarization, particularly for those
consumers with conspiratorial views. One very prominent ex-
ample of this is the rise of alternative media platforms such as
Gab, Bitchute, and Voat [10], which harbor conspiracy theorist
and hyper-partisan information producers. These platforms
self-proclaim that they have been created to promote free
1www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/
speech rights that have been taken away from them through
the demonetization and removal from contemporary platforms
like Twitter and YouTube. While the movement of partisan and
conspiracy media from mainstream platforms to alternative
platforms may stagnate misinformation flow to the wider-
public (which is still up for debate), it also creates even more
extreme echo chambers, which can lead to radicalization [30].
These negative results do not necessarily invalidate the
applicability of current approaches. The active engagement
of social scientists are needed to understand how and when
employing such methods are necessary to reduce potential
harm to individuals especially on social media. There is
evidence that fact-checking efforts discourage politicians from
lying and can, under the right conditions, change consumer
beliefs [8]. There is also evidence that automated methods help
consumers determine if a news article is unreliable or biased,
particularly with feature-based explanations [31]. However,
the benefits are not uniform: users who read or share news
on social media benefit less from these type of explanations.
Lastly, there is evidence that flagging false news can reduce
false news sharing [32], which suggests that filtering out or
demoting maliciously false content can prevent its spread to
the wider-public. Despite these positive results, there are also
ample negative results which should be addressed. This paper
proposes one idea to begin addressing them.
B. Nudges and Choice Architectures
Highly related to the method proposed in this paper is
the concept of nudging. The concept of nudging has been
well studied in the field of Behavioral Economics. The idea
was particularly popularized by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein’s 2008 book entitled Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness [13]. According to
Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge is:
“any aspect of the choice architecture that alters
people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives. To count as a mere
nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to
avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye
level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does
not.”
In other words, nudges are small changes in the choice ar-
chitecture that work with cognitive biases in decision making.
The choice architecture is simply the environment in which
a decision is being made, and that decision is nudged by
this environment, even if it is not purposely designed to do
so. Being nudged by a choice architecture is unavoidable.
A classic example is the ordering of items in a list, where
the items atop the list are often selected more than any
other item in the list, even if the ordering is arbitrary [33].
Another example is keeping the status quo. If something is
set by default (i.e. the ringtone on a phone) it is unlikely
to be changed [13]. Because these subtle, but influential,
environmental nudges are unavoidable, Thaler and Sunstein
argue that these environments should be purposely designed
to make nudges beneficial [13].
There are situations where well-designed nudges may be
particularly helpful. People tend to make bad choices when
a situation’s cost are not realized until later, the decision is
difficult to assess, the choice being made is infrequent, or there
is no immediate feedback [13]. In these cases, a well-designed
nudge can benefit the decision maker.
Consuming online news cuts across many of these situ-
ations. Often consuming information has no immediate im-
pact on the reader or sometimes the direct impact on the
individual consumer is never realized, as its impacts may be
on a societal level. In some cases, there is a direct impact
on the individual consumer, but it is delayed. For example,
a news consumer may choose not to vaccinate their child
due to false information on vaccination safety. After some
time, their child may catch a preventable disease due to this
misinformed decision. Because of this delayed and sometimes
indirect feedback from information consumption, it may be
difficult to translate the costs and benefits of news reading de-
cisions to the consumer. Additionally, as previously discussed
in Section II-A, humans use many mental shortcuts when
assessing information. The choice architecture of online news
consumption often exacerbates the use of these shortcuts. One
such example is the passive nature of scrolling through a social
media feed. Rather than actively seeking information about
current events, users are passively consuming this information,
sometimes piecemeal, creating potentially incorrect factoids
when recalling reported events. This infinite-scrolling design
choice nudges users to consume passively.
There are many ways current news consumption systems,
like social media, could be improved through better choice en-
vironments and nudges. In fact, many of these design changes
are quite simple, but may oppose the current profit-driven
architectures of social media platforms. Examples include:
• Limiting infinite scrolling or auto-play features, to nudge
users to more actively consume information,
• Setting the default news feed for new user accounts to
contain reliable and diverse information sources, utilizing
status quo bias [13],
• Show diverse alternatives next to a given news article
in a news feed, providing an opportunity for the user to
choose higher quality or diverse information,
• Provide a portion of the body text with the title of an arti-
cle in news feed, avoiding “implied misinformation. [23]’.
In many of these systems, there is an additional layer
in the form of recommendation or sorting, which explicitly
influences what news is consumed (often much more explicitly
than one would consider a “nudge” to be). In a sense, these
recommendation systems are filtering down the choices of
information to consume, in the same way Netflix filters down
our movie choices based on what we previously watched.
However, while recommendation about what movie to watch
is rather benign, recommending what information to consume
may not be. Information that is highly engaged with is not
necessarily information of high quality [34]. Hence, removing
the engagement-based recommendation systems for news con-
sumption alone may be enough to nudge better consumption.
III. USING TRUSTFUL NUDGES IN NEWS
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the potential downfalls of discrediting partisan in-
formation and the complexity of information trust, we propose
using “nudges” to help consumers make better consump-
tion and sharing decisions. Specifically, we propose a trust-
based recommendation model for news quality called Trust
Nudging. The model’s goal is to provide subtle recommenda-
tions to readers in order to nudge them towards news producers
of objectively higher quality, without demanding a substantial
challenge to one’s beliefs. At a high level, suppose we are
given two partial orderings of information sources, one along
a trust/belief axis and one along a nonpartisan quality axis. The
objective is given an article A, find an alternative article B that
is higher in quality than A and has some proximity to A along
the trust dimension. The trust nudge is the act of providing
to the user article A and B together in any point where they
are making a decision, such as to share or to read. Users have
the choice to read or share one, both or none of the articles.
Both the quality dimension and the trust dimension can be
approximated in many ways and be computed at different
granularity. We present one approach in this paper.
To implement the Trust Nudging model, we need several
pieces of information:
1) A relationship graph between news sources, which is
used to approximate the likelihood that a user will trust
a given news source.
2) An approximate ground truth of both quality and po-
litical leaning for each news source in the relationship
graph. This is used in both in the trust calculation and to
ensure recommendations are of higher quality than the
users’ current consumption.
3) A set of user reading profiles, which simply state what
news sources a user reads or trusts. In real life this could
be the news a user is exposed to in his social media feed.
The key to implementing the model is the news source
relationship graph. While theoretically this relationship graph
can represent a number of different relationships, such as text
similarity, topic similarity, or political leaning, the graph must
form a structure that relays the likelihood of consumer trust
across the sources.
One example of this structure is a news producer Content
Sharing Network (CSN) constructed from a representative
sample of news and media sources and articles published
them in a similar time frame. Several recent studies build on
such datasets have shown that news sources often share (or
copy) articles from each other either verbatim or in part [6],
[35], [36]. When these verbatim copies are formulated as
a network, they form meaningful communities of differing
sources in the news ecosystem [35], including communities of
conspiracy news, partisan news, and mainstream news. Each of
these communities represent fairly homogeneous parts of the
news ecosystem. Media sources that hold the same ideological
values, report on similar events, and write with similar styles
are captured in these communities [35]. Hence, we expect
sources which copy from each other at a high rate to be similar
to each other. Extending from this, we expect that sources
which are not necessarily directly connected, but near each
other in the network space (i.e. same community, peripheral
of the same community, etc.) should be alike in some regard.
We assume that this similarity leads to a higher probability
of trust for these sources than a randomly chosen source of
higher quality. See Figure 1 for an example network.
Using this network we can model a consumer’s trust for a
source by placing that consumer’s reading profile as a node
in the network. For example, given a consumer is subscribed
to 5 sources on Facebook, we can use these 5 sources to
approximate that consumers location in the network space (e.g.
by averaging the vector representation of each of the 5 sources
in the network using an embedding method) and model trust as
the distance of consumer to any source in the network. If we
have a measure of quality for each news source (e.g. how many
times the source has published false news, etc.), we can ensure
our recommendation is of higher quality than the news the
consumer currently reads, but also ensure that the consumer
has a high chance of trusting that recommendation. Note,
depending on the method of approximating the likelihood of
trusting a recommendation, the recommended alternatives may
not necessarily present very different or diverse points of view,
especially if the initial article is on an extreme spectrum of
unreliability. However, the main objective is to nudge the user
towards higher quality, rather than immediately recommend a
gold standard article or source, which may be difficult for the
user to accept. We contrast this approach with misinformation
detection methods that seek to discredit, demote, or filter out
information of lower quality.
In some sense, this approach can also be contrasted with
traditional social recommendation algorithms that aim to only
maximize engagement, rather than quality. However, the goals
of each recommendation algorithm are fundamentally differ-
ent. More importantly, inline with the concept of nudging,
our approach is providing a recommendation as an alternative,
not as the next step. It may be possible to implement both
engagement-based recommendations (e.g. Facebook’s news
feed algorithm or YouTube’s up next feature) with the Trust
Nudging model, but this is left for future work.
The quality ground truth required by the Trust Nudging
model can be built from various criteria, such as whether
they have published outright incorrect information in the past,
posted corrections to errors, provide transparency of financial
interests, or distinguish between news and opinion. There are
already organizations that provide this level of analysis, which
we will use in our proof-of-concept example [37]. While these
source-level quality labels are a great start, such measures can
be further improved and made more granular.
Fig. 1: News producer Content Sharing Network (CSN) used as the relationship graph in the Trust Nudging simulation
based on data described in Section IV. Each node represents a news producer, each directed edge represents verbatim copy
relationship (where A→ B means B copies an article from A), the size of the node represents the nodes outdegree, and colors
represent communities of sources computed using directed modularity.
IV. THE TRUST NUDGING MODEL IN SIMULATION
To illustrate the Trust Nudging method, we construct a proof
of concept recommendation system based on real data. We
build each of the three sets of information from this data
set: the news relationship graph, the source entity, and the
user entity. We then make recommendations based on the
trust nudge. We show how such a model may work based
on simulations based on certain assumptions of user behavior
and discuss the results.
a) Data: To ground our work on real data, we extract
news article data from the NELA-GT-2018 dataset [37] and
combine it with news article data we collected in the first
9 months of 2019, giving us a total of 1,814,682 articles
from 271 sources over 19 months. The NELA-GT-2018 dataset
is released with a set of source-level labels from multiple
organizations including independent and journalistic venues
(NewsGuard, Open Sources, Media Bias/Fact Check, Allsides,
BuzzFeed). These labels include both measures of quality and
measures of political leaning. We extract and extend these
labels for our simulation, discussed below.
b) Relationship graph: While the Trust Nudging model
can be implemented with many different news relationship
graphs, we use a content sharing network (CSN) in this
example (as discussed in Section III). Using our combined
dataset, we construct a CSN using the same method used
in [35]. Specifically, we compute a TF-IDF matrix of all
articles in the data set and compute the cosine similarity
between each article vector pair (given that each article comes
from a different news source). For each pair of article vectors
that have a cosine similarity greater or equal to 0.85, we extract
them and order them by the timestamps provided with the
data set. This process creates a directed graph G = (V,E),
where V is a news source and E is a directed weighted
edge representing articles shared. Edges are directed towards
Algorithm 1: Simulation algorithm
Data: u=User(Su) - the input user profile;
S - the set of sources with quality score qs, leaning ls
and embedded vectors vs;
T - the number of iterations T;
L - user limited attention;
α - cost parameter;
Result: Updated user profile u′
initialization;
t← 0;
while t < T do
s′ = argmins(t(s, u))|qs > qu);
if s′ is not NULL then
if |Su| ≥ L then
drop source(u, {Su, s′});
end
else
accept source(u, s′);
end
update scores(u);
end
end
return u;
publishers that copy articles (inferred by the timestamps).
We normalize the weight of each edge in the network by
the number of articles published in total by the source. The
end result is a near-verbatim content sharing network of
news sources. This network can be found in Figure 1. After
constructing the network (which naturally filters down both
articles and sources), we have 102,879 pairs of articles and
195 sources (which have copied or been copied from) over 19
months. The constructed network can be found in Figure 1.
c) Source entity: In order build our simulation, we must
know both the approximate quality of a news source and the
political leaning. Both quality and political leaning can be
extracted from the ground truth provided in the NELA-GT-
2018 dataset. Specifically, we determine the quality score of
a source by normalizing the scores provided by NewsGuard. In
addition, we give a score of 0 to sources that have been flagged
with at least one of the following labels: by Open sources as
fake, conspiracy, junksci, or unreliable or by Media Bias/Fact
Check as conspiracy, pseudoscience, or questionable source.
The leaning score of a source is computed by averaging the
scores from fields AllSides bias rating, Buzzfeed leaning,
Media Bias/Fact Check left bias or right bias, the resulting
leaning score is normalized to the interval [−1, 1], where −1
indicates a left-wing bias and 1 a right-wing bias. For the
few sources that do not have any labeled data in NELA-GT-
2018, we estimate the quality score and leaning by averaging
its neighbors quality score and leaning in the CSN. It can be
argued that this may be a noisy approximation of both quality
and leaning, but for the purposes of our simulated example
these potentially noisy labels are fine. More specifically, for
s be a source in S, we define the quality score qs of s as
a number in [0, 1] obtained via the aforementioned approach.
Similarly, the leaning ls of s is a number in [−1, 1].
Additionally, we obtain a vector based representation vs for
each source s by embedding the s is a vector derived from
the embedding CSN using node2vec [38] with 64-dimensional
vectors. This representation captures the closeness, or similar-
ity, of nodes in the CSN.
d) User entity: Lastly, we need a set of users to nudge in
the simulation. Let u user in the set of users U . User u has a set
Su of trusted sources, which has a maximum size specified by
a limited attention parameter L. We assume that a user has a
limited number of sources that it can attend to, or trust, at any
moment. From set Su we determine the quality score, leaning,
and CSN representation, qu, lu, vu, respectively, associated
with u on their news consumption profile by averaging the
quality score, leaning, and CSN vectors of the sources in Su.
e) Trusted recommendation: Now that we have a news
relationship graph, a set of sources with ground truth, and
a set of users with reading profiles, we can begin making
recommendations. A recommendation consists of suggesting
a new source s′ to user u at a time t. The probability that
user u will trust s′ depends on u’s profile. We denote it by
the conditional probability pu(s′|Su). Our model considers
both the leaning and the CSN representation of u and s′ to
compute pu(s′|Su). More specifically, we compute the leaning
differential ∆lu,s′ as the normalized distance between lu and
ls′ , and we compute the source distance dus′ as the cosine
distance between vu and vs′ . We define the trust cost of
recommending s′ to u as:
t(s′, u) = pu(s′|Su) = (1− α)∆l + αdus′ (1)
Where α ∈ (0, 1) is a hyper-parameter to control the weight
of the source distance and the leaning in the function, ∆l =
|lu−ls′ |
2 , and dus′ = 1 − cos(vu, vs′). Concretely, we define
the trust cost as a function of how dissimilar the new source
is from the user’s profile with respect to their position in the
CSN and their political leaning.
If the user accepts the recommendation, source s′ is added
to Su. If |Su| = L, the user drops one source at random chosen
from the following distribution:
pdrop(s) =
t(s, u)∑
t(si, u)
for si ∈ Su ∪ {s′}
Note that s′ may be dropped in this process, which means it
was rejected by the user. If s′ is not dropped, the user leaning
and quality score are updated.
f) Simulation of trusted recommendations over time:
Given a user profile u, the simulation runs for T discrete
time steps. At each time step t ≤ T , the model produces
a recommended source s′ meeting the criteria that qs′ > qu
requiring the least trust cost, thus:
s′ = argmins(t(s, u)|qs > qu)
If the user’s set of sources |Su| ≥ L, one source in Su ∪ s′
is chosen and discarded (this can be thought of as the source
being distrusted by the user or simply no longer being read
by the user due to limited attention). Otherwise, s′ is accepted
with probability 1 − t(s′, u). If s′ is accepted, u’s profile is
updated by calculating the new means for qu, lu, and vu. This
procedure is repeated for T iterations, when the updated profile
of u is obtained. Notice that once qu = 1, no recommendation
is made since the user has reached the maximum score possible
according to the model, we refer to the earliest t at which
qu = 1 as the convergence point. Algorithm 1 outlines the
simulation procedure.
A. Simulation Results
We ran the simulation on four synthetically developed user
profiles. The profiles were chosen to depict users with distinct
characteristics with respect to political leaning and the types
of sources they trust (conspiracy, left-leaning, right-leaning,
etc.). User profiles are shown in Table I.
a) Pathways to high quality news: Figure 2 shows the
quality score (left side) and leaning (right side) trajectories
for each user. All users converge to a quality of 1, although at
different times, the gray box indicates convergence to a quality
of 1. Some of the sources along each pathway are emphasized,
their scores (quality and leaning) are annotated in parentheses
in each figure. The ending profile and scores of users can be
seen in Table II. Observing the simulation results, we are not
only able to see the final set of sources of users, but also the
pathway taken by each of them in order to reach a high quality
news consumption standard at each time step.
Importantly, the first recommendation made for each user is
of higher quality than the user’s average reading profile, but is
very similar to both their reading profile in the CSN space and
their reading profile in terms of the political leaning. While the
quality is always higher than the user’s average reading quality,
it may not be much higher depending on the extremity of lean-
ing and connectedness of the reading profile in the CSN. For
example, User A is first recommended Freedom Bunker, which
is a low quality (quality score of 0.3) right-wing (leaning score
of 0.5) source, but this source is both higher quality (user’s
quality score of 0.075) and less extreme (user’s leaning score
of 0.622) than the user’s reading profile. User A had a 96.7%
chance of accepting that recommendation. Similarly, User D is
recommended a low quality (quality score of 0.2) left-leaning
(leaning score of 0.1) source that is of higher quality than the
user’s reading profile. User D had a 94.2% chance of accepting
this recommendation. In both cases, the user’s overall quality
score improves after accepting the first recommendation. As
expected, user’s with less extreme profiles have a higher
chance of accepting the first recommendation and converge to
high quality quicker. User B had a 97.8% chance of accepting
the first recommendation and User C had a 99.3% chance of
accepting the first recommendation.
As time progresses, users’ likelihood of trusting a rec-
ommended source will remain small. However, as the users
accept recommended sources, their reading profile will slowly
change, allowing for higher quality (or more dissimilar to the
original reading profile) sources to be recommended. It is clear
that the jump from Freedom Bunker to Fox News is less costly
than the jump from Freedom Bunker to Politico. Similarly, the
jump from TheAntiMedia to RT is less costly than the jump
from TheAntiMedia to NPR.
Interestingly, as a side effect of increasing quality, the model
also lessens the partisan extremity of the news being read (with
the exception of User D, who already was not very extreme
in political leaning, only quality).
b) Comparison to a trust-unconstrained model: The
Trust Nudging model is a trust-constrained model because
the choice of recommendation is a function of the trust cost.
A trust-unconstrained model would provide recommendations
that are not necessarily functions of trust, or do not take
trust directly into account when making decisions. A trust-
unconstrained model can be thought of as a recommendation
system that recommends gold standard news no matter the
consumer. For comparison, we modified our model to become
trust-unconstrained by removing the trust function from the
source selection step and simply picking a source that incre-
ments the overall quality score of the user. We then looked
at the progression of the trust cost for each iterations step
t comparing the constrained and unconstrained models. As
seen in Figure 3, the trust cost for the unconstrained model
started at a much higher value than the constrained one, as time
passed, the trust cost started to reduce because the user had
incorporated high quality source to their profile and became
naturally closer to good sources in the CSN space. Even
though both models converge at approximately the same time,
one may argue that it is unlikely for a user to accept drastic
changes during the first recommendations since they are highly
unlikely to trust them. In the simulation model, the user is
repeatedly exposed to the recommendation, eventually leading
to acceptance. However, in real life, a user may begin to
distrust the recommendation system or stop using the platform
due to repeated and abrupt recommendations.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a trust-based news recommen-
dation model which nudges consumers towards higher quality
without demanding a substantial challenge of one’s beliefs.
The potential benefit of such a model is the ability to move
extreme or conspiracy news consumers towards higher quality
information, a population which is hard to persuade. We
provide a proof of concept for the Trust Nudging model
through simulation. Using this simulation we show that the
model can slowly improve news consumption over time while
recommending sources which the user is likely to trust. We
also show that, as a side effect of improved quality, hyper-
partisan news consumers eventually consume less partisan
news. Although conclusions that can be drawn from this
simulation are limited, the purpose of this paper is to open up
a new technical research path for misinformation mitigation,
namely using nudges in news algorithms rather than filtering,
demoting, and discrediting.
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Fig. 2: Recommendation pathways. On the left are the trajectories of the quality score of the user, some sources are emphasized
along the pathway, enclosed in parentheses are the quality score of each source; the gray box indicates convergence. On the
right are the leaning trajectories, enclosed in parentheses are the leaning score of each source.
User Starting Quality Starting Leaning Starting Sources
User A 0.075 0.622 Infowars, Newswars, Prison Planet, Veterans Today, Natural News
User B 0.350 -0.854 Daily Kos, Shareblue, Bipartisan Report, Delaware Liberal, Addicting Info
User C 0.524 1.0 Breitbart, Conservative TreeHouse, CNS News, The Epoch Times, Western Journal
User D 0.098 -0.158 21st Century Wire, Mint Press News, Global Research, The Duran, Intellihub
TABLE I: Starting User Profiles used in simulation. Quality score is a number between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest quality.
For each user this is computed by taking the average quality score of the news sources they read. Leaning is a number between
-1 and 1, where -1 is far left leaning and 1 is far right leaning. Again, this score is computed by averaging the political leaning
of the users reading profile.
User Ending Quality Ending Leaning Ending Sources Time
User A 1.0 0.516 National Review, Real Clear Politics, The American Conservative, Politico, Fortune 54
User B 1.0 -0.500 CBS News, The New York Times, The Guardian, Washington Post, The Denver Post 14
User C 1.0 0.516 Real Clear Politics, National Review, Fortune, The American Conservative, Politico 20
User D 1.0 -0.250 FiveThirtyEight, Business Insider, NPR, The Hill, BBC 59
TABLE II: User Profiles After simulation. Quality score is a number between 0 and 1, where 1 is the highest quality. For each
user this is computed by taking the average quality score of the news sources they read. Leaning is a number between -1 and
1, where -1 is far left leaning and 1 is far right leaning. Again, this score is computed by averaging the political leaning of
the users reading profile. Time is the number of iterations the user took to get to a quality of 1.0.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the trust cost for the constrained and
the unconstrained models for User A. Notice the initially trust
cost for the unconstrained model. This suggests that users are
unlikely to accept the recommendations at the beginning.
There are many ways this model can be improved. For ex-
ample, rather than only defining trust as a function of similarity
in the CSN, more granular relationship graphs can be used,
such as the similarity of writing style between sources. We can
also model trust as a function of the difference in attitude, or
stance, towards a topic, provided that certain sources are more
reliable or more similar when reporting on specific topics.
Additionally, multiple news relationship graphs can be used
at once through a multi-layer network. The value of these
various news graphs, in terms of representing consumer trust,
should be tested.
This model can also be improved through more complex
objective functions. For example, rather than only operating on
quality, the model can also nudge towards view-point diversity.
Such a system may expose users to better or more diverse in-
formation even if it is not clicked. Previous research shows that
titles play a big role in disseminating misinformation. Many
readers will consume news passively and form opinions based
on the titles alone. In such cases, even the exposure to slightly
different framing of information may create some amount of
doubt in low quality information, especially since sources
are chosen based on potentially trusted sources. Moreover,
this type of model can create financial incentive for sources
to provide a better quality of information instead of models
based on engagement which tend to favor more sensational
information and models based on gold standards that can be
hard to define in some cases. In an effective implementation
of our method, many sources have a chance to get engagement
by providing better quality information.
Of course there are many unknowns about this type of nudg-
ing recommendation model that should be assessed. While in
theory our simulated trust calculation makes sense, in actuality
trust is likely much more complex. Other trust factors, such
as user stances on specific topics, whether a friend had read
or shared the news, or coherence of news story, could be
accounted for, as long a quality measure is still held as the
objective. It is likely these more granular trust factors are
consumer-dependent and can change across readers. Namely, a
user’s trust may be modeled not only with respect to their news
consumption profile, but also in terms of how much influence
they receive from their peers and their susceptibility to such,
thus adding new dimensions to the definition of trust. This
increased trust complexity may produce different behavior
over time. For example, rather than eventually converging to
the highest quality sources, there may be a point in which
consumers can no longer be nudged, hence plateauing the
quality we can achieve. User studies should be implemented
to assess interaction with the algorithm.
There are also some potentially negative consequences of
using this type of model, as news consumers will continue to
be exposed to bad and incorrect information without seeing
any warnings regarding its incorrectness. Hence, users will
continue to form incorrect beliefs that may be very hard to
overcome. In addition, even if higher quality information is
available, users may never choose to read it as they do not
find it engaging. The hope is that this exposure to low veracity
news will diminish as the consumers are nudged; however, it
is unknown how long it will take consumers to gain trust for
higher quality sources and when/if they will stop accepting
nudges. Another potentially negative consequence is the newly
created incentive for malicious sources to game the system. It
is possible that a smart malicious source can work to become a
’middle quality’ source, which will be recommended to users
who previously consumed extreme news. These malicious
sources may even be able to control both the extreme news
being consumed and the middle quality news being recom-
mended. The robustness to adversarial manipulation should
be explicitly tested. Finally, questions of how this model can
work in harmony with other policies and community standards
regarding unacceptable content requires additional research.
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